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MISSOURI
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 60

SPRING 1995

NUMBER 2

A Comparison of the Interpretation of
Statutes and Collective Bargaining
Agreements: Grasping the Pivot of Tao
James E. Westbrool*

Professor William Popkin asked the following questions in discussing
competing perspectives on the interpretation of statutes:
But what is a statute? Is it what the writer intends, what the text means, or

what the reader creatively derives from the evidence of statutory meaning?1

The same questions can be asked about collective bargaining contracts. In the
collective bargaining context, writers refers to management and labor, the
parties to the agreement, text refers to the express language of the contract;
and reader refers to the arbitrator. The answers given to Popkin's questions
have important implications for how arbitrators go about their task of
determining the meaning of collective bargaining contracts.
There has been an explosion in writing about statutory interpretation in
recent years.2 Legal scholars have responded to theoretical writing about
interpretation in general and to articles and judicial opinions by judges with
an impressive array of articles and books. The purpose of this Article is to
reflect on some of the common assumptions and interpretive practices of
arbitrators in the light of this writing about statutory interpretation. It would
* Earl F. Nelson Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of
Law; member, National Academy of Arbitrators. I am grateful to Herbert Wolkowitz,
William G. McCaffiree, and Eugene G. Bushman for the summer research grant that
enabled me to work on this article.
1. WmLAM D. POPKN, MATmEIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLrrICAL LANGUAGE
AND THE POLrnCAL PROcESs 309 (1993). Much of the organization of this article is
based upon Professor Popkin's reader, text, and writer framework. He also used this
framework in William D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory
Interpretation,68 IND. L.J. 865 (1993) [hereinafter Popkin, Responsibility].
2. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat; The Revival of
Theory in StatutoryInterpretation,77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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be a mistake for arbitrators to borrow ideas about statutory interpretation
without carefully considering differencesbetween collective bargaining and the
legislative process and between the role of judges and arbitrators. On the
other hand, arbitrators face many of the same issues in interpreting collective
bargaining contracts that judges face in interpreting statutes. Both judges and
arbitrators are charged with determining the meaning of a text. The new
literature on interpretation can provide useful insights for arbitrators and the
parties to arbitration proceedings. I believe that arbitrators and other labor
relations professionals will understand interpretation issues better and be less
apt to overlook such issues if they familiarize themselves with some of this
literature.
First, I will summarize some of the common assumptions arbitrators
make about the interpretation of labor agreements. I will give a brief
overview of some of the interesting writing on statutory interpretation in
recent years. I will then review some issues in the interpretation of collective
bargaining contracts in light of this writing and my personal experience as a
labor arbitrator. I will organize the discussion under three headings: the
reader, the text, and the writers. I believe this organization is helpful because
these are the three fundamental perspectives from which one can approach the
task of interpretation. Looking at the same task from three different
perspectives can enhance one's understanding.
There is a consensus among arbitrators that their primary responsibility
is to discover and implement the mutual intent of the parties.3 Since it is
usually assumed that the text of the agreement is the best indication of party
intent,4 an emphasis on intent is not considered to be inconsistent with respect
for the text. Arbitrators often base interpretations on the "plain meaning" of
the text.' I believe that one reason the consensus on the importance of intent
has developed is because experience and the insights of commentators have
convinced most arbitrators that the text alone does not provide defensible
answers to all of the issues they face. The text frequently is ambiguous.
Some arbitrators and commentators assert that language is inherently

3. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRKs 348 (4th
ed. 1985); JAY E. GRENIG, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT INTMRPRETATION, LABOR AND
OYMENT ARBrrRATION 14-4 (Tim Bomstein & Ann Gosline eds., 1993); Carlton
J. Snow, ContractInterpretation: The PlainMeaning Rde in Labor Arbitration,55
FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 683 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Duluth Community Action Inc., 82 Lab. Arb. 426, 430 (1984)
(Boyer, Arb.); Phelps Dodge Copper Prod. Corp., 16 Lab. Arb. 229, 233 (1951)
E

(Justin, Arb.).

5. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp., Ray Miles Division, 70-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8849, at 5851 (1970) (Abemethy, Arb.); Clean Coverall Supply Co., 47 Lab.
Arb. 272, 277 (1966) (Witney, Arb.); ELKOuRI & ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 86
(Marlin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 1985-89 Cum. Supp.).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/1
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ambiguous.6 Reliance on allegedly clear text could sometimes lead to absurd

results

In some cases there is eidence that the parties did not intend what

the text appears to suggest.8 The parties' agreements on how to deal with
recurring issues not expressly covered by the collective bargaining agreement
are routinely enforced by arbitrators.9 Important issues arise which have not
been dealt with in the agreement and have not been resolved by the parties in
their day-to-day dealings.1" These and other considerations have led
arbitrators to look beyond the text on a regular basis for other evidence of the
meaning of the agreement. The search for party intent provides a defensible
rationale for consideration of much of this evidence.
The traditional guide to the appropriate use of text and other evidence of
meaning is set forth in the plain meaning rule. When the language of the
agreement is "plain," "clear," or "unambiguous," the arbitrator is supposed to
follow it without considering other evidence of meaning." Under the plain
meaning rule, evidence of mutual intent such as bargaining history and past
practice is not considered unless the arbitrator concludes that the text is
ambiguous.12 Although the plain meaning rule has been criticized by
arbitrators, courts, and commentators, it continues to be invoked by
arbitrators. 3

I. AN INTRODUCTION TO RECENT WRITINGS ON INTERPRETATION
Deconstruction, associated most prominently with French philosopher
Jacques Derrida, denies the possibility of a single correct or most defensible
interpretation of a text and asserts that it is impossible to discover a writer's
intent."
Critical Legal Studies scholars have used the techniques of
deconstruction to undermine established legal doctrines and interpretations."i
By pointing out the assumptions underlying conventional doctrines and

6. See Snow, supranote 3, at 685-88 (discussing ambiguous nature of language).

7. See Consolidation Coal Co., 83 Lab. Arb. 1158 (1984) (Duff, Arb.).
8. Maple Heights Bd. of Educ., 86 Lab. Arb. 338, 342 (1985) (Van Pelt, Arb.);
Circle Steel Corp., 85 Lab. Arb. 738 (1984) (Stix, Arb.).
9. See Metal Specialty Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1265, 1269 (1962) (Volz, Arb.).
10. See Clyde W. Summers, CollectiveAgreements & the Law of Contracts,78
YALE L.J. 525, 551-56 (1969).
11. GRENIMG, supra note 3, at 14-6; Snow, supra note 3, at 697.
12. Snow, supranote 3, at 681-82.
13. Snow, supranote 3, at 682, 684, 688-95.
14. Peter C. Schanck, The Only Game in Town: An Introductionto Interpretive
Theory, Statutory Construction,andLegislativeHistories,38 KAN. L. REV. 815, 821,
826 (1990) [hereinafter Schanck, Game].
15. Id. at 820.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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interpretations and showing that these assumptions are not inevitable, they try
to turn consensus into uncertainty. 16 By asserting the primacy of the reader

over the writer of text, deconstructionists have gone even further than the legal
realists of the 193 0's in emphasizing the freedom judges have in interpreting

text.
Legal scholars such as Ronald Dworkin and William Eskridge, although
accepting more limitations on judges' discretion than the deconstructionists,
have responded to the literature on interpretation and cases such as United
Steelworkers v. Weber" by developing theories of interpretation which urge
judges to use their freedom to achieve good results. Dworkin asserts that
judges should interpret law to make it the best it can be.'" Eskridge's theory
of dynamic statutory interpretation asserts that statutes should be interpreted
in light of evolving societal and legal conditions to reach a result "that is most
consonant with our current web of beliefs and policies surrounding the
statute.119

Public choice scholars have developed a theory that has been particularly
influential with conservative judges and scholars. Applying economics
methodology to the legislative process, they offer what they believe is a more
realistic view of the legislative process.20 Public choice theory views statutes
as frequently the result of compromises struck by competing interest groups,
rather than as embodying broad public purposes, and it challenges the
assumption that legislators should be thought of as reasonable persons

16. One of their interesting interpretive arguments is that the constitutional
provision requiring the President to be thirty-five years of age should not prevent a
mature thirty-four year old from becoming president, since the purpose of the provision
is to prevent immature people from becoming president. Id. at 823-24. Compare
Mark Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in ConstitutionalTheory, 58 S.
CAL. L. REv. 683, 686-88 (1985), with RIcHARD A. POSNmE, LAW AND LrERATLJRE
219-20 (1988) [hereinafter PosNE LrruRA ,E].
17. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Philip Frickey believes that Weberplayeda pivotal role

in reviving interest in statutory interpretation. Frickey, supranote 2, at 245.
18. Schanck, Game, sitpranote 14, at 852 (referring to RONALD M. DwoRKIN,
LAw's EMPIRE 231, 233 (1986)). For a criticism of Dworkin's approach to statutory
interpretation see Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric And Reality In The Theory of Statutory
Interpretation: Underenforcement,Overenforcement,and The Problem of Legislative
Supremacy,71 B.U. L. REv. 767, n.59 (1991).
19. W'illiam N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479, 1483 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic] quoted in Schanck, Game,
supranote 14, at 853.
20. See Frickey, supranote 2, at 250. Acceptance of public choice theory does
not always lead to a conservative position. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macy, Promoting
Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 CoLUM. L. Rv. 223 (1986).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/1

4

Westbrook: Westbrook: Comparison of the Interpretation of Statutes and Collective Bargaining Agreement

1995]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEME7

pursuing reasonable purposes.2 1 Legislators should instead be viewed as
brokering legislative deals between interest groups. These assertions have
produced skepticism in some quarters about the widely held assumption that
statutes should be interpreted to carry out their broad purpose.
Public
choice proponents believe the "purpose approach" often leads to a result
contrary to the actual legislative compromise and encourages judges to read
their personal preferences into statutes?3
Three federal judges who once served together on the University of
Chicago Law School faculty have had a major impact on statutory
interpretation in recent years. They have built upon public choice theory and
have added their own distinctive insights. Judge Richard Posner of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals accepts the necessity of going beyond the
text in the search for statutory meaning," but cautions against judicial
reliance upon broad statutory purpose.'
He asserts that "the idea of a
statute's being a command issued by a superior body (the legislature) to a
subordinate body (the judiciary) provides a helpful way of framing inquiry
into the principles of statutory interpretation."26 Viewing a statute as a
command suggests that judges should respectthe legislative compromise rather
than try to make the statute the best it can be. Judge Posner believes that if
the lines of legislative compromise are not clear, judges should "imaginatively
reconstruct" what the legislature would have done if it had dealt with the issue
before the court.2 In terms of the questions asked at the beginning of this
article, Judge Posner's emphasis is on the writer. His description of the task
of interpretation is, however, more realistic and sophisticated than traditional
formulations which stress the writer's intent.
Two other former Chicago professors have created an approach to
interpretation that has been described as "new textualism."28 Frank
Easterbrook, also a judge on the Seventh Circuit argues that legislatures "do
21. Friokey, supra note 2, at 250-51; Schanck, supra note 14, at 843.

The

assumption of reasonableness was made in one of the most important works on
statutory interpretation in the 1950's. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
TBE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLMS iNTHE MAKNG AND APPLICATiON OF LAW
1415 (tentative ed. 1958).
22. The "purpose" approach of Hart and Sacks is summarized in Frickey, supra
note 2, at 249.
23. Frickey, supra note 2, at 251.
24. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEmS OF JURISPRUDENCE 262-69 (1990)
[hereinafter PosNER, PROBLEMs].
25. Frickey, supra note 2, at 251.
26. POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 24, at 265.
27. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroom and in the
Courtroom,50 U. CI-I.
L. REv. 800, 817-20 (1983).
28. Frickey, supra note 2, at 255.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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not have 'intents' or 'designs,' hidden yet discoverable. Each member may
or may not have a design. The body as a whole, however, has only
outcomes."29 This conclusion was based on that part of public choice theory
which portrays the legislative process as chaotic and legislative choices as
often the product of accident." Some scholars have used the premise that
it is impossible to discover legislative intent as an argument for judicial
activism in pursuit of desirable goals;3 Judge Easterbrook uses this premise
as an argument for an increased emphasis on text. Unless the legislature uses
general language which, in effect, invites the courts to play a creative role in
developing rules to reach the legislative goal, he believes that a statute should
be considered irrelevant to the case at hand unless the case is plainly resolved
by express language in the statute. 2 Judge Easterbrook believes that this
approach is more faithful to the proper role of judges in our system of
government,33 recognizes that only the text is voted on by both houses of
Congress and signed by the President,34 and has the virtue of preferring
private over governmental ordering of social and economic relations.35 Judge
Easterbrook's conclusion that it is misleading to speak of legislative intent
caused him to advocate a limit on the use of legislative history, although he
does believe there are some appropriate uses of legislative history.36
In a series of speeches 7 and judicial opinions,3 United States Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia launched an aggressive attack on the use of
legislative history and argued for an increased emphasis on statutory text.
Other commentators have stressed the vagueness and malleability of legislative
history. Judge Harold Leventhal, for example, once said that the search for
legislative history was like "looking over a crowd and picking out your

29. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. CI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Domains].
30. Id. at 547-48. See also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative
Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 423-28 (1988).
31. See Eskridge, Dynamic, supranote 19, at 1538-44.
32. Easterbrook, Domains,supra note 29, at 544-46.
33. Easterbrook, Domains,supra note 29, at 552.
34. See Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does LegislativeHistory Tell Us?, 66 CmI.KENT L. REv. 441, 445 (1990) [hereinafter Easterbrook, History].
35. Easterbrook, Domains,supra note 29, at 549-50.
36. Easterbrook, History, supra note 34, at 444. For a discussion by Judge
Easterbrook of appropriate uses of legislative history see id. at 442-44, and his opinion
for the Court in In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989).
37. Frickey, supranote 2, at 254.
38. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989)

(Scalia, J., concurring).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/1
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friends."39 Justice Scalia has gone beyond admonitions to be cautious in the
use of legislative history to challenge its reliability and legitimacy. Believing
that legislators, lobbyists, and congressional staffers manipulate legislative
history in order to influence judicial interpretation of statutes, he maintains
that it is not reliable evidence of legislative intent." He appears to question
the desirability of even trying to determine legislative intent.4 ' He believes
excessive reliance on legislative history runs counter to the constitutional
requirements for enacting a statute, since only the statutory text-not reports
and speeches-is voted on by both houses of Congress and signed by the
President. 2 He maintains that the subjectivity of the search for intent in
legislative history gives judges more discretion than they should have under
our system of government.43 Justice Scalia's radical skepticism about the use

of legislative history and the search for intent has led him to emphasize
reliance on the text and canons of construction:
I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of
language in a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in
its textual context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask
whether there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning other
than the ordinary one applies.44
Although Justice Scalia has not persuaded a majority of the Supreme Court to
refrain from using legislative history,45 his continuing critique of its use
appears to be having a significant impact. In a 1983 article, Judge Patricia
Wald made the following comment: "Not once last Term was the Supreme
Court sufficiently confident of the clarity of statutory language not to double
check its meaning with the legislative history."46 Writing in 1992 when he
was a Court of Appeals Judge, Justice Stephen Breyer pointed out that in

39. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observationson the Use ofLegislativeHistory in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting Judge
Levanthal).
40. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
41. See WestVirginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991); Green,490
U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).

42. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).

43. See the discussion in WilliamN. Eskridge, Jr., LegislativeHistory Values, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV.365, 372-73 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, Values].
44. Chisomv. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991)
(White, J. joined by seven Justices).

46. Wald, supranote 39, at 197.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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1989, the Court decided ten out of sixty-five statutory cases without referring
to legislative history and that in 1990, the Court decided nineteen out of fiftyfive such cases without using legislative history.4"
Legal scholars have written about the implications for statutory
interpretation of deconstruction, the "conventionalism" of literary theorist
Stanley Fish, and postmodem thought in general.4" They have proposed
comprehensive new approaches to statutory interpretation.49 They have
challenged Judge Easterbrook and Justice Scalia," and have faced a
counterattack from Judge Easterbrook.Y They have comprehensively reexamined old issues such as the use of canons of construction.52 They have
produced new casebooks which capture the essence of the new
developments. 3 They have provided insightful comparisons of statutory
interpretation in various countries of the world.54 Reflecting on the torrent
of scholarship, one scholar has said that, "the past decade has probably been
the most fruitful in history for legal academics in the field of legislation. 1155

47. Stephen G. Breyer, On the Uses ofLegislativeHistoryinInterpretingStatutes,

65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 846 (1992).
48. See, e.g., Peter C. Schanck, UnderstandingPostmodern Thought and Its
Implicationsfor StatutoryInterpretation,65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2505 (1992) [hereinafter
Schanck, Postmodern];Schanck, Game, supranote 14.
49. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretationas PracticalReasoning,
42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber,
The Inevitability of PracticalReason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45
VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992) [hereinafter Farber, PracticalReason];William D. Popkin,
The CollaborativeModel of StatutoryInterpretation,61 S.CAL. L. Ray. 541 (1988)
[hereinafter Popkin, CollaborativeModel]; Posner, supranote 27, at 817.
50. See, e.g., Eskridge, Values, supranote 43; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New Textualism].
51. Easterbrook, History,supranote 34.
52. Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation,45
VAND. L. REV., 529, 529-795 (1992).
53. See WLAm N. ESK=iDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:

STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

(1988); OTTO J. HETZEL ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2nd ed. 1993); POPKIN, supranote 1.
54. INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COPARATVE STUDY (D. Neil MacConnick &
Robert S. Summers eds., 1991) [hereinafter INTERPRETING STATUTES].

55. Frickey, supra note 2, at 241. Professor Martineau appears to believe that
Professor Frickey exaggerated the significance of this body of scholarship. Robert J.
Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist
New of Statutory Construction,62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 40-42 (1993).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/1
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II. THE READER

A. Introduction
Should the interpretation of labor agreements be viewed primarily as a
creative effort in which arbitrators use their freedom to achieve good results?

Can one understand contract interpretation better if she focuses primarily on
the role of the reader? Would such an approach make it more likely that

arbitrators will discharge their responsibilities in a way that meets the needs
of the parties and is consistent with national labor policy?
If you are convinced that language is inherently indeterminate or that a
text lacks meaning until it is interpreted and that interpretation is best
understood as a dialogue between the interpreter and text,56 it is natural to
stress the role of the reader. The first premise of a reader perspective is that
this is the most accurate description of the process of interpretation. It is
possible to argue that if one wants to understand the latest thinking on the
interpretation of text, it is necessary to approach the subject from a reader
perspective. It would be inaccurate, however, to assume that any writer who
emphasizes the creative role of judges in interpreting statutes shares the
extreme text skepticism of the deconstructionists. Some of the most
influential proponents of an active, creative role for judges in interpreting
statutes accept the fact that judges are and should be constrained in a variety
of ways by the text and other evidence of statutory meaning." In the field
of statutory interpretation, an emphasis on the reader can result in the extreme
text skepticism of the deconstructionists or a desire for judges to use the
discretion that arises from uncertainty in statutory meaning to promote good
public policy and adapt statutes to societal changes.
B. Misgivings About a Reader Perspective
Although there is much to be gained from looking at the interpretation
of labor agreements from a reader perspective, I do not believe it should be
the primary metaphor relied upon by arbitrators. The literature which
emphasizes the reader's creative role can help arbitrators acquire a more
realistic understanding of what is involved in interpreting a text. Its emphasis
on the reader's freedom and discretion can serve as a helpful reminder of the
wisdom of Dean Shulman's assertion while discussing the labor arbitrator's

56. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 49, at 345-46 (discussing interpretation

as a dialogue between interpreter and text).
57. See, e.g., PoP1Kn, supranote 1, at 314-15; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
49, at 380-83; Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes In the Regulatory State, 103
H-Iv. L. REv. 405, 423 (1989).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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role that, "In the last analysis, what is sought is a wise judgment."58 There
are, however, several problems associated with a reader perspective, whether
the emphasis is on extreme text skepticism or on using indeterminacy as a
rationale to embark upon a search for good results.
An arbitrator who openly professed a deconstructionist point of view
would drastically reduce her chances of being chosen by management and
labor to arbitrate their disputes. Experienced representatives of management
and labor are fully aware of the uncertainty which permeates the negotiation
and arbitration processes, but neither the parties to the contract nor the courts
would accept the notion that the contract is so indeterminate it places no
significant constraints on the arbitrator.59 I am convinced that an open
espousal of deconstruction would not play well in the real world of labor
arbitration. This, however, is not an argument against the merits of a
deconstructionist position as much as it is a recognition of practical problems
associated with its espousal. If an arbitrator believes that all texts are
indeterminate-and I assume there are arbitrators who do-such an arbitrator
is faced with the question whether she should hide her belief and whether such
a course of conduct would be ethical.
The lesson I would draw from my more than twenty years of interpreting
collective bargaining contracts is that deconstructionists exaggerate the degree
ofindeterminacyfacing the interpreters of text. I frequently have experienced
what I thought was "plain meaning," although I would now explain that
experience differently. Today, rather than saying that the text is clear, I would
say that the application of the text to a particular situation is clear. Further,
I would assume that my conclusion was based on both text and contextual
considerations. I believe that text and other evidence of contractual meaning
can and should operate as significant constraints upon arbitrators. I also
believe that often it is possible to predict the outcome of a contested
interpretation of a labor agreement because of the shared assumptions that the
arbitrator and the parties bring to their reading of the text of the agreement.
I also have misgivings about a reader perspective which assumes that the
text is a significant constraint on arbitrator discretion but stresses the
opportunity that textual uncertainty gives arbitrators to make contracts the best
that they can be. There are articles by distinguished arbitrators which stress
the arbitrator's creative role. Dean Shulman persuasively explained why
collective bargaining contracts cannot cover everything clearly.6" David
Feller pointed out how, "The very nature of the agreement and the complex

58. Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract,andLaw in LaborRelations, 68 HARV. L.
REv. 999, 1016 (1955).
59. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 27-32 (discussing some of the
relevant case law).
60. Shulman, supra note 58, at 1004.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/1
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organization which it governs often require substantial implication."61 Clyde
Summers explained how the parties to a contract may be bound in ways they
"did not intend, foresee or understand."'62 Archibald Cox helped clarify the
arbitrator's role by showing that the labor agreement can be viewed as an
"instrument of government" 63 and that contract interpretation "is not limited
to documentary construction of language."" Reading the literature on
statutory interpretation reinforces the teachings of these commentators that the
interpretation of a labor agreement cannot and should not be a mechanical
process. On the other hand, re-reading these classics from the arbitration
literature in light of the statutory interpretation literature, has caused me to
question some aspects of Cox and Summers' descriptions of the arbitrator's
role and to change my mind on a particular issue discussed by Professor Cox.
Professor Cox suggested that one appropriate role for an arbitrator is to
be an activist and impose his view upon the agreement when its words

leave scope, bringing doubtful territory into the joint realm because he
thinks that he knows that this is fair and good industrial relations. A wise
do much good through this conception of the
and respected man may
65
arbitrator's function.
Professor Summers asserted that the contract isn't rigidly limited by the
parties' intent and that this fact
invites inquiry beyond the often futile or artificial search for nonexistent
intent and encourages explicit consideration of such factors as the purposes
of the parties and the institutionalneeds of collective bargaining, justice and
fairness between the parties, the interests of third parties, and the public
interest. It also prevents preoccupation with the particular wording of the
document and focuses more attention on the legal effect to be given the
agreement. In weighing all of these considerations, the choice is made in
the agreement is then completed or
terms of the results to be reached;
66

shaped to accomplish that result.

61. David E. Feller, A GeneralTheory of the CollectiveBargainingAgreement,

61 CAL. L. REv. 663, 748 (1973).
62. Summers, supra note 10, at 551.
63. Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon LaborArbitration,72 HARV.L. RV. 1482,
1503 (1959).

64. Id. at 1499.
65. Id. at 1506. Professor Cox followed this statement with a quotation from
Learned Hand which briefly stated the case for restraint. Id. at 1506-07.
66. Summers, supranote 10, at 551-52.
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Professor Cox implied from the nature of the labor agreement an undertaking
not to discharge an employee without just cause even when the agreement is
silent on this issue.' Professor Feller reached the same conclusion but based
the implication upon the existence of seniority provisions, "which appear to
grant security of employment and the right to preference in both the filling of
vacancies and in the choice of employees for layoffs."6 Professors Cox and
Summers emphasized the reader's role in interpretation. Professor Cox's
conclusion that a just cause provision can be read into a silent contract was
easier to reach because of his emphasis on the reader's perspective. I argue
later that viewing a contract from the writer's perspective can help arbitrators
discharge their responsibilities appropriately. The literature which discusses
legislative intent has persuaded me that Professor Summers was wrong when
he asserted that the search for a party's intent is often futile or artificial. I
also argue from the writer's perspective it is a mistake to read a just cause
provision into a silent contract. The point I want to make here, however, is

that a sophisticated understanding of the nature of language and the inability
of those charged with interpreting text to read the writer's mind do not,
standing alone, justify efforts by arbitrators to do what they consider fair and
good, or in the public interest. There are problems associated with any
approach to interpretation, but the fact that there are no alternatives free of
problems means that interpreters of text must of necessity work with an
imperfect approach. There is an occasional tendency on the part of
commentators to assume that one need not take an approach seriously once
problems have been identified. The fact that the meaning of a text often is
obscure, and that the intent of its drafters often cannot be ascertained, does not
justify ignoring or downplaying text or intent. The most serious problem with
that approach is it arrogates more power to the interpreter than appropriate.
It can cause a judge to defer less than she should to the legislature and an
arbitrator to defer less than she should to the parties to the contract. If one
assumes that communication between writer and reader is possible, then text
and intent should not be deemphasized just because working with them
sometimes is difficult. There is a middle ground between result selection and
literalism and this is where arbitrators should position themselves.

C. The PlainMeaning Rule
An important lesson that can be learned from looking at interpretation
from the reader's perspective is that the plain meaning rule is a wholly
inadequate guide to dealing with the text of a collective bargaining contract.
Not only does it fail to provide helpful guidance in deciding when and how

67. Cox, supra note 63, at 1503.

68. Feller, supra note 61, at 749.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/1

12

Westbrook: Westbrook: Comparison of the Interpretation of Statutes and Collective Bargaining Agreement

1995]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEVENTS

to use extra-textual sources in interpreting contracts, but there is reason to
suspect that in practice it results in the text being given less respect than
appropriate. The case against the plain meaning rule is grounded primarily in
a broad consensus that the meaning of a text depends on context and
background assumptions." As Judge Easterbrook has said, "Words do not
have natural meanings; language is a social enterprise. Textualists, like other
users of language, want to know its context, including assumptions shared by
the speakers and the intended audience."7 When a legislature uses the word

fruit in a statute and the statutory interpretation question is whether a tomato
is a fruit or vegetable, the answer may turn on whether the intended audience

was ordinary people or professional botanists.7 When citizens of the United
States read the constitutional provision that requires the President to be thirtyfive years old, we assume that age is measured from birth rather than
conception. According to Judge Posner, the assumption in India would be that
birth is measured from conception.72 If the phrase "foul play" were used, we
would need to know the context in order to decide whether it referred to a
criminal act or a baseball event.'3 People do not interpret written or oral
messages by relying only on dictionaries and grammatical rules; readers and
listeners rely on their total experience in interpreting messages and writers and
speakers assume without conscious reflection that they will do so. 4 If a
servant is told to bring into a room all of the ashtrays in another room, the
speaker could reasonably assume that the servant's total experience would
cause him to interpret the command as not including ashtrays that are attached
to the walls.' When a reader believes that a text is "plain" or "clear," "[fit
is not the text which is plain, but its application to a given situation."76 Easy
cases seem easy because everyone involved is familiar with the context and
shares background norms.77
The fact that all interpretation is contextual both refutes the literalism of
the plain meaning rule and provides an argument against extreme text

69. See, e.g., INTERPBETNG STATUTES, supranote 54, at 517; POPKIN, supranote
1, at 307-15; POSNER, PROBLEMS, supranote24, at 262-69; Eskridge & Friokey, supra
note 49, at 341-45; Popkin, CollaborativeModel, supranote 49, at 591-94; Sunstein,
supra note 57, at 423.
70. Easterbrook, History,supranote 34, at 443.

71. This issue arose inNix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893), discussedin PoPgKN,
supra note 1, at 338-39.
72. POSNER, PROBLEMS, supranote 24, at 266.
73. POPKIN, supra note 1, at 312.
74. POSNER, PROBLEMS, supranote 24, at 266.
75. PosNER, PROBLEMS, supranote 24, at 268.
76. PoPKIN, supra note 1, at 312.
77. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 423.
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skepticism. Professor Sunstein asserts that "claims about the inevitable
indeterminacy of interpretation usually suffer from a failure to take account
of the contextual character of linguistic commands... . Judicial interpretation
of statutes is . . . quite predictable, largely because background norms are
uncontested among the judges.""8 An influential explanation of how
agreement in the interpretation of texts is possible is the idea of the
"interpretative community" developed by Professor Stanley Fish. 9 Similar
background, training, and experience causes members of a group to hold
certain assumptions in common. Consensus on the meaning of texts is
possible because interpretation is based on these shared assumptions.8 0 The
American legal community can be viewed as an interpretive community, as
can the various professionals involved in labor arbitration.
If the meaning of a text depends on context and background assumptions,
a crucial step in interpretation is deciding what evidence of context and
background assumptions will be considered.8 ' The text which surrounds the
words or phrases at issue is often helpful in interpretation. Professor Popkin
refers to this as internal context.' Canons of construction such as ejusdem
generis and expressio unius est exclusio alterius deal with issues of internal

context. Examples of external context that might shed light on the meaning
of a text are the discussions of the writers (legislative history in the case of
statutes and bargaining history in the case of collective bargaining contracts)
and the contemporary circumstances out of which the text emerged.' The
interpreters of statutes and contracts have regularly consulted a broad range
of evidence of internal and external context in their search for meaning.
Justice Scalia, the most famous textualist of our time, looks to most of the
relevant contextual evidence. According to Daniel Farber,
To deride this approach as mindless literalism would clearly be a mistake.
On the contrary, Justice Scalia's approach extends beyond the dictionary
meaning of the phrase in dispute to include a fairly rich array of other
factors. Indeed, apart from his steadfast refusal ever to consider legislative

78. Sunstein, supranote 57, at 441-42. Judge Posner makes a strong case against
extreme text skepticism in POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 24, at 271, 293-95.
79. See Schanck, Game, supranote 14, at 833-37 (summarizing Professor Fish's
ideas and citations to his writings).
80. Schanck, Game, supra,note 14, at 835. Professor Schanck describes the
process as follows: "Readers do impose their own meanings, but their own meanings
are detemined by interpretive conventions-the tacit strategies, constructs, or practices
of the communities to which they belong." Id.
81. See POPK N, supra note 1, at 307, 309.
82. PoPK , supra note 1, at 340.
83. See PoPxmN, supra note 1, at 307.
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history . . . his approach seems to contain nearly the full range of
considerations that might be thought relevant.84

When the plain meaning rule is evaluated in light of the consensus on the
importance of context and background assumptions, several shortcomings
emerge. 5 A typical summary of the plain meaning rule used in labor
arbitration states that "arbitrators are required to give effect to the literal
meaning of the contract's language without consulting other indicia of intent
or meaning when the language is 'plain' or 'clear and unambiguous.' 8' s The
first thing wrong with the plain meaning rule is use of the words plain, clear,
and unambiguous. Depending on one's assumptions about language and
interpretation, either no text is plain or arbitrators encounter uncertainty in
interpreting text often enough that the plain meaning rule is an inadequate
guide to the relative importance of text and other evidence of contractual
meaning. If an arbitrator following the plain meaning rule decides that the
language at issue is ambiguous, there could be a tendency to forget about the
text and concentrate solely on such evidence of meaning as bargaining history
and past practice. Labor relations professionals need a summary of the use of
text that stresses its primacy but does not condition this primacy on a
condition-it must be clear-that is extremely difficult to satisfy.
Those who assume that textual clarity is possible must concede that there
are degrees of clarity. How clear must the text be for the plain meaning rule
Courts have had difficultly dealing with this question."
to apply?9
Reliance on the rule can mask the considerations which lead the interpreter to
characterize the text as clear. After all, one's common sense indicates that
something that is clear does not need further explanation.
Although it is difficult to marshall empirical evidence on the issue, I
believe that the plain meaning rule is sometimes relied on simply to save time
and effort. I suspect it is used when arbitrators think the correct result is
obvious and do not see a need to spell out all the contextual reasons why it
is obvious. I also suspect it is used when arbitrators are skeptical of the
reliability of evidence of past practice or bargaining history and do not want
to go into the great detail necessary to explain why they believe it is

84. Farber, PracticalReason,supra note 49, at 546.

85. For persuasive arguments against the use of the rule in labor arbitration see
Snow, supra note 3.
86. GRENIG, supra note 3, at 14-6.
87. Professor Shauer discusses this issue in Frederick Shauer, The Practiceand

Problems of PlainMeaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV.

715, 737-38 (1992).
88. See Snow, supranote 3, at 685-86.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 1

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 60

unreliable. In a situation such as this, it is tempting just to assert that the text
is clear and that ends the matter.
Since the meaning of a text depends on context and background
assumptions, it follows that interpretation should be based upon available,
reliable evidence of internal and external context. As Judge Easterbrook once
said, "[to decode words one must frequently reconstructthe legal and political
culture of the drafters." 9 The plain meaning rule mandates acontextual
interpretation unless the first reading of the text in issue raises questions. A
refusal to consider contextual evidence will undermine the quality of the
interpreter's decision making process. By tempting the interpreter to rely

upon the text at issue in isolation, perhaps with assistance from a dictionary,
the plain meaning rule diverts the interpreter from thinking about how people
actually communicate." It also tempts the interpreter to substitute her own
background assumptions for those of the parties.91 Moreover, what seemed
clear after the first reading of a text, may not seem clear when all available,
reliable evidence of context is considered. In asserting that legislative history
may not be used to reach a result contrary to the text, but may be used to help
discover the meaning of text, Judge Easterbrook stated that legislative history,
"may show ...that a text 'plain' at first reading has a strikingly different
meaning."' This is the reason why some courts have held that non-textual
evidence of meaning may be considered to determine whether ambiguity
9
exists. 3
It seems likely that the plain meaning rule does not in practice cause as
many problems as one might expect. A high percentage of arbitrators
probably are familiar with the criticisms so persuasively advanced by
commentators such as Raymond Goetz,94 Arthur Murphy, 9 and Carlton

89. In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989).
90. See POPIQN, supranote 1, at 340 (discussing literalism).
Professor Schauer argues that this is not inevitable. He asserts that "the reliance
on plain meaning need not commit the interpreter to reading single words or even
single sentences in isolation. The issue is one of the size of the domain of information
available to the interpreter. Although an approach focusing on single sentences would
be possible, it is not compelled by the notion of plain meaning." Shauer, supranote
87, at 740.
91. See Snow, supranote 3, at 704-05 and text accompanying notes 56-59, 71-74
(discussing the anomaly of arbitrators' usage of the plain meaning rule).
92. Sinclair,870 F.2d at 1344. Judge Easterbrook's opinion for the Court in this
case is an excellent example of how different his textualism is from the literalism of
some judges and arbitrators who purport to follow a plain meaning approach.
93. See Snow, supranote 3, at 683, 689-92 (discussing judicial criticisms of the
plain meaning rule).
94. RAYMOND GOETZ, COMMENT ON MuELLER, THE LAW oF CONTRACTS-A

CHANGING LEGAL ENViRONMENT, PROCEDINGS OF THE 31ST ANNUAL MEETING,
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Snow.96 Aware of the problems with the rule, they probably ignore it, take
the fairly easy route of declaring the text ambiguous or susceptible of more
than one plausible meaning, or admit extrinsic contextual evidence to
determine whether ambiguity existsY. I doubt that many arbitrators exclude
external contextual evidence such as past practice and bargaining history.
Most arbitrators follow the sensible approach of taking most evidence offered
by the parties "for what it is worth.""8 I suspect that the typical reaction of
an arbitrator to an objection to external contextual evidence on the basis that
the contract is clear would be to assert that she needs more time to reflect on
the text of the contract before deciding whether it is clear or ambiguous. At
the very least, an arbitrator should read all related parts of the contract before
concluding that a particular word or phrase is clear. It would slow down the
hearing too much to do that before ruling on the objection. Moreover, as
indicated earlier, there is authority supporting the admission of non-textual
evidence to help in deciding whether the text is ambiguous. 99
If, as seems likely, most arbitrators are not led astray by the plain
meaning rule, can we simply conclude that the plain meaning rule is a
harmless relic from the past? I suspect some courts and arbitrators who
continue to use the plain meaning rule"' have made mistakes in interpreting
contracts by failing to broaden their inquiry because of a conclusion that the
word or phrase in question was clear. I am especially concerned about the
reaction of inexperienced arbitrators to evidentiary objections and interpretive
arguments based on the plain meaning rule. Another problem I have with an
approach of benign neglect is that we need summaries of how to use text
along with other evidence of contractual meaning that draw on contemporary
understanding of the nature of language and interpretation. I believe the
inadequacy of the plain meaning rule sometimes causes arbitrators to give the
text of a contract less weight than it deserves. I have read briefs in arbitration
cases which failed to present internal contextual arguments that were available.

Some advocates focus solely on the dictionary meaning of the words or
phrases at issue and then move on to evidence of bargaining history and past

(BNA 1979).
95. Arthur W. Murphy, Ol Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-MeaningRule" and
Statutory InterpretationIn the Modem FederalCourts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299
(1975).
96. Snow, supranote 3.
97. See Snow, supra note 3, at 683, 689-92.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 218, 222

98. See MARVN F. HILL,

JR. & ANTHONY

V.

SINICROPI,

EVmENCE

IN

ARBITRATION 7 (BNA 1980).

99. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
100. See Snow, supranote 3, at 683-84, 692, 697-99 (discussing the anatomy of
the plain meaning rule and the plain meaning rule in arbitration decisions).
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practice. There are persuasive arguments against wholesale adoption of the
textualist approach of Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook, but I believe most
arbitrators and advocates could improve their ability to work with text by
reading some of the opinions dealing with internal contextual arguments.'
The plain meaning rule tempts arbitrators to jump over these internal
contextual arguments to evidence of past practice and bargaining history, once
they conclude that the specific contractual language in question is ambiguous.
I.

ThE TEXT

A. Introduction
In interpreting collective bargaining agreements, should arbitrators
deemphasize external contextual evidence of meaning and focus primarily on
the text? Would such an approach help arbitrators meet the needs of the
parties better? Is it more consistent with our national labor policy? What
light does the literature on statutory interpretation shed on these questions?
It will be helpful at the beginning to note the distinction which Professor
Popkin makes between textualism and literalism. He points out that textualists
make a genuine effort to understand how language is used while literalists
tend to look at texts in isolation, often relying only on the dictionary."°
Textualists such as Judge Easterbrook and Justice Scalia are aware of the
importance of context and background assumptions and employ a range of
contextual aids to interpretation. For example, they say that statutory terms
should be interpreted to harmonize with the structure of the rest of the
statute,0 3 and so as to be "most compatible with the surrounding body of

101. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.).
102. POPIUN, supranote 1, at 340.
Professor Popkin uses different terns in Popkin, Responsibility, supra note 1.
He distinguishes between Plain Meaning Textualism, which is concerned with how
legislative writers communicate with their audience, and Surface Textualism, which
is concerned with grammar and style. Id. at 872-76. Professor Popkin's Surface
Textualism is similar to the literalism I am criticizing. He asserts that Justice Scalia
is guilty of Surface Textualism. Id. at 889 n.36. I find it useful to compare how
Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook work with statutory text with how arbitrators
relying upon the "plain meaning rule" work with the text of collective bargaining
contracts. Although I do not accept the Textualist approach, I apparently have more
admiration than Professor Popkin does for the facility with which Justice Scalia and
Judge Easterbrook work with statutory text.
103. In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989).
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law into which the provision must be integrated."' 4 Justice Scalia and
Judge Easterbrook are willing to depart from the text when it produces an
absurd result."0 5 The case for textualism is strengthened when interpreters
go beyond literalism.
I indicated earlier that textualists emphasize the importance of text partly
because they are skeptical of some of the other guides to statutory meaning.
Judge Easterbrook, for example, does not believe that the subjective intent of
legislators can be discovered and should not be considered "the law" if it
could be discovered.0 6 The most important evidence of legislative intent

is legislative history. Although Judge Easterbrook believes legislative history
can legitimately be used to show a statute's "context, including assumptions
shared by the speakers and the intended audience,"'0" he does not believe it
should be consulted to discover "where the sponsors wanted to go,"10 8 to

"dictate the meaning of rules,". ° to imaginatively reconstruct a statute's
meaning,110 or to change a statute's "level of generality.""' Textualism
prefers the meaning derived from a contextual reading of text to the meaning
derived from a search for intent. And the textualist is reluctant to use the
uncertainty created by a divergence between text and alleged intent to choose
the alternative that produces the best result."'
B. For and Against Textualism
Several arguments can be made for a textualist approach. It is possible
to maintain that it is more compatible with democratic values and our
constitutional procedures for adopting statutes. Only the text was voted on by
both houses of Congress and signed by the President."' The general public

104. Green v. Book Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). For a discussion of Justice Scalia's use of structural arguments see
Eskridge, New Testualism, supra note 50, at 660-63.
105. See, e.g., Green, 490 U.S. at 527; Sinclair,870 F.2d at 1344.
106. Easterbrook, History,supranote 34, at 441.
107. Easterbrook, History,supra,note 34, at 444.
108. Easterbrook, History,supra,note 34, at 444.
109. Easterbrook, History,supra,note 34, at 445.
110. Easterbrook, History,supra,note 34, at 449.
111. Easterbrook, History,supra, note 34, at 449.

112. See Schauer, supranote87, at 740. Professor Schauer uses the phrase "plain
meaning approach" to describe essentially the same approach I have called textualist.
I would prefer to discard the phrase "plain meaning" because of problems with the
word "plain" and the fact that many interpreters who have relied on "plain meaning"
have taken a literalist approach. The phrase has too much unfortunate baggage.
113. See Sunstein, supranote 57, at 416.
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has easier access to statutes than to legislative history and is entitled to rely
upon the text of statutes."' Legislative history, on the other hand, is subject
to manipulation by both those involved in the legislative process and those
who interpret statutes. Reliance on legislative history also gives an advantage
to litigants with more resources because it is difficult and expensive to find
and use." 5 Inasmuch as the search for intent and reliance on legislative
history increases opportunities for courts to read their policy views into
statutes, a textualist approach could be said to be more faithful to the
separation of powers provided for in state and federal constitutions and more
apt to confine judges to their proper role." 6 Textualism could be said to

promote legislative supremacy more effectively.

7

Although a good case can be made that judges should devote more time
to analyzing statutory texts,"' there are several persuasive reasons to reject
the textualism of Judge Easterbrook and Justice Scalia. Statutory texts alone
do not provide answers to many of the issues that courts must resolve, even
when interpreted with the skill of Scalia or Easterbrook. A primary reliance
on text will sometimes produce bad results that are not really required by
respect for legislative supremacy, legislative history is not as unreliable as
Justice Scalia asserts, and the textualism advocated by Justice Scalia and Judge
Easterbrook is, in the final analysis, unfriendly to the legislative branch of
government.
The nature of communication and the nature of the legislative process
combine to produce statutes that, standing alone, fail to iaswer many of the
issues that reach the courts. It was pointed out earlier that there is a broad
consensus that the meaning of a statute depends on context and background
assumptions. "' Internal contextual evidence often will not be enough to
give determinate meaning to a statute. Statutory indeterminacy has many
causes. Statutory terms often are so general they amount to an invitation to
the courts to look for guidance outside the text. 20 Courts sometimes have
114. See Sunstein, supranote57, at 416; Popkin, CollaborativeModel,supranote
49, at 595.
115. See Popkin, CollaborativeModel, supra note 49, at 596.
116. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction,11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59,62-63 (1988) [hereinafter Easterbrook,
Intent]; Sunstein, supranote 57, at 416, 424.
117. See American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1190 n.19 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (Starr, J.).
118. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 50, at 625.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 69-80.
120. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 421. Judge Easterbrook accepts a creative
role for courts in such a situation. He views it as a delegation of power to courts to
"create and revise a form of common law." Easterbrook, Domains, supranote 29, at
544.
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to look beyond the text to ascertain whether words should be given an
ordinary or a technical meaning.'
Statutory provisions often have more
than one plausible meaning. 22 Important issues are not dealt with in
statutes because the legislative body failed to anticipate certain questions,
could not agree on how to deal with a controversial issue and deliberately left
the statute vague, or did not have enough time to deal with the issue."
There are times when statutory text is determinant but points to a result
a court believes legislators would not desire if they had anticipated the
situation. Professor Sunstein suggests, for example, that a court should not
construe a statute authorizing an employer to discharge an employee "for any
reason" as permitting the employer to discharge an employee who refused to
commit a crime on the employer's behalf.'
Determinant texts are sometimes questioned because they are overinclusive. For example, Professor Sunstein asserts that a statute prohibiting
vehicles in public parks should not be interpreted to exclude a monument
consisting of tanks used in World War II because the monument would not
contribute to the problems the statute was enacted to prevent.'25 Perhaps the
most famous example of over-inclusiveness is the case of Rector of Holy
Trinity Church v. United States. 26 An English minister was hired by a
church in New York City. The question presented was whether this violated
a statute prohibiting the importation of aliens "to perform labor or service of
any kind in the United States.' ' 27 The textual case against the church was
strengthened by the fact that a list of exceptions to this general language did
not include ministers but did include actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and
domestic servants.'
In holding that the statute was not applicable, the
court emphasized that the purpose of the statute was to prevent the importation
of cheap, unskilled labor, thus, importing a minister was not within the spirit
of the statute.129 Holy Trinity continues to be relied on by those seeking to

121. See Popkin, CollaborativeModel, supranote 49, at 600.
122. See the example in Breyer, supranote 47, at 853, text accompanying n.24.
See also POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 24, at 263.
123. See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supranote 24, at 279. Judge Easterbrook accepts
a creative role for judges when the legislature uses general language. See supranotes
32, 120, and accompanying text.
124. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 420.
125. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 419.
126. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
127. Id. at 458.
128. Id. at 458-59.
129. Id. at 465.
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escape the confines of statutory text. Justice Kennedy recently suggested that
reliance on the Holy Trinity argument is un-democratic. 30
Determinant texts are sometimes questioned because they are underinclusive. Suppose, for example, that the literal text does not cover private
conduct which causes the kind of mischief the statute was passed to
3
provides an example of under1
Baker v. Jacobs,1
suppress.131
inclusiveness. In that case, a successful plaintiff invited the jurors to a nearby
hotel where he bought them cigars. A statute provided for setting aside
verdicts when parties gave jurors "any victuals or drink" either before or after
the verdict. Although cigars are not victuals or drink, the court set the verdict
aside because it concluded133that plaintiff's conduct was "within the true intent
and spirit of the statute.
I will discuss the concept of intent in the section on the writers'
perspective. However, at this point I would like to mention some of the
reasons why some writers have not been persuaded by the textualists' attack
on legislative history. Courts regularly use legislative intent or history to
justify going beyond or counter to the statutory text to fill gaps, avoid
unacceptable results, resolve ambiguity, or expand or contract the text. The
good achieved by doing so usually outweighs the problems identified by
textualists. It has been argued that a refusal to consider legislative history
would unfairly disappoint expectations created by the courts' long tradition of
using legislative history. 34 The textualists' attack upon the reliability of

legislative history has been challenged. Justice Stephen Breyer, for example,
has argued from his personal experience that "in fact, the history itself often
is clear enough to clarify" an ambiguous statutory provision.'35 Justice
Breyer also has asserted that legislative history makes it easier for citizens to
use statutes because it clears up uncertainty and he has expressed doubt that
reliance on the kinds of canons used by textualists would be a less costly way
for citizens to go about understanding unclear statutes.' 36 He believes that
average citizens would "find legislative history far more accessible than a
Blackstone 'canon' .... .13' He also suggests that less use of the committee
system would strengthen special interests because the committee system is

130. Public Citizenv. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,473-74 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).

131. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 420-21. In the taxation field, courts
sometimes stretch statutory language in order to combat evasion. Id. at 421.
132. 23 A. 588 (Vt. 1891).
133. Id. at 589.
134. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supranote 50, at 683.
135. Breyer, supra note 47, at 862.
136. Breyer, supranote 47, at 868-69.
137. Breyer, supranote 47, at 870.
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more accessible to the public and requires more public justification by special
interests.'38 To Justice Breyer, the textualists' arguments against legislative
history "call, not for abandonment of the practice, but at most for its careful
use." 139

Professor Eskridge and Professors Farber and Frickey have

suggested that rather than promoting democratic values, textualism is
unfriendly to democratically achieved legislation.14 A court committed to
working with, rather than against, the legislative branch should try to
understand and implement the legislature's goals rather than insist that the
legislature change the way it works by deemphasizing debates and committee
reports. As Judge Posner has said,
If a court is reasonably sure what the legislators were driving at..., a
refusal to give effect to their purposes because they did not dot every i and
cross every t is defensible only if one has some principled objection to
legislation in general. So one is not surprised to find that Easterbrook also

defends his suggested approach by reference to the political principle of
41
limited government.'

Daniel Farber suggests that textualists rely too much on language and do not
14
rely enough on judges' good judgment.
C. Textualism and Labor Arbitration

The literature on the textualists' approach to statutory interpretation has
convinced me that those involved with labor arbitration would benefit from
a renewed emphasis on text. However, they should not accept the textualist
attack on the concept of intent and the use of external contextual evidence of
textual meaning. Most of what can be said about statutory interpretation can
also be said about the interpretation of labor agreements. Both courts and
arbitrators should devote more time to analyzing the language of the text they
are charged with interpreting. 143 The distinction between literalism and
textualism is as useful in understanding the interpretation of labor contracts as
it is in understanding the interpretation of statutes. 44 There are as many
138. Breyer, supra note 47, at 873.
139. Breyer, supra note 47, at 847.
140. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 50, at 683; Farber & Frickey, supra

note 30, at 468.
141. POSNER, PROBLEMS, supranote 24, at 291. For an interesting example of

how Judges Easterbrook and Posner apply their different approaches in a specific case
see United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane).
142. Farber, PracticalReason,supra note 49, at 551.

143. See supra text accompanying note 119.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
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problems with sole reliance upon text in the interpretation of labor
contracts,' 45 as there are in the interpretation of statutes.146
Is there an appropriate application in labor arbitration of Judge
Easterbrook's argument that in the absence of general language inviting courts
to play a creative role, statutes should be considered irrelevant unless an issue
is plainly resolved by express language?14 Many labor agreements provide
that the employer cannot discipline or discharge employees in the absence of
'"just cause." The phrase "just cause" is so general that it invites the arbitrator
to play a creative role in defining the kind of conduct that justifies discipline
or discharge. Assume, however, that the issue before an arbitrator is not
covered by general language such as just cause or by specific language. Does
that mean that the collective bargaining agreement is irrelevant? Experienced
arbitrators probably will recognize that this sounds like the reserved rights
doctrine. James Phelps argued at the 1956 meeting of the National Academy
of Arbitrators that management retains discretion over all matters not covered
by express language in the labor agreement.148 C. C. Killingsworth has
countered that this assumption ignores the practical situation faced by an
employer whose employees are unionized but who has not yet agreed to a
collective bargaining contract.149 He also has argued that the pristine

version of the reserved rights doctrine was rejected by the United States
Supreme Court15 ° in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Proponents of this view believe that management has implied
Co.15
obligations not specifically provided for in the agreement." 2 Rather than
choose between the reserved rights and implied obligation theories, most

145. See supra text accompanying notes 4-11.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 120-34.
147. See supra note 33.
148. JAMES C. PHELPS, MANAGEMENT'S RESERVED RIGHTS: AN INDUsTRY
VIEW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF

ARBITRATORS 117 (BNA 1956).
149. C. C. KILLINGSVORTH, THE PRESIDENTrAL ADDRESS:

MANAGEMENT

RIGHTS REVISITED, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 4-5 (BNA 1969).
150. Id.

151. 363 U.S. 574 (1960). "The labor arbitrator's source of law is not confined
to the express provisions of the contract, . . . The parties expect that [the labor
arbitrator's] judgment... will reflect not only what the contract says but.., such
factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the
morale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished."
Id. at 581-82.
152. GLADYS W. GRUENBERG, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION 16-4, 16-5 (Tim Bomstein & Ann Gosline eds., 1993).
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arbitrators appear to focus instead on the particular facts and contract language
in each case.153
I doubt that arbitrators who have not been persuaded by James Phelps
would change their mind after reading Judge Easterbrook's article. Judge
Easterbrook and James Phelps have both proposed guides to interpretation that
are grounded in substantive preferences. As Judge Posner said:
It is not an accident that most "no constructionists" are political liberals and
most "strict constructionsts" are political conservatives. -The former think

that modem legislation does not go far enough and want the courts to pick
up the ball that the legislators have dropped; the latter think it goes too far
and want the courts to rein the legislators in. Each school has developed
interpretive techniques appropriate to its political ends. 54

Arbitrators who do not share James Phelp's substantive preferences are not
likely to be more persuaded by textualist arguments to adopt the reserved
rights approach.
Is there an appropriate application in labor arbitration of Justice Scalia's
and Judge Easterbrook's arguments against the use of legislative history in the
interpretation of statutes? The question arises because of the obvious parallel
between the use of legislative history in interpreting statutes and the use of
past practice and negotiating history in interpreting collective bargaining
agreements. Arbitrators regularly admit and consider negotiating history in
interpreting contract language.155 They consider the proposals and counterproposals presented by the parties during negotiations, minutes of negotiating
sessions, handouts prepared for the other party, notes kept by the parties for
their own files, oral testimony of persons who attended negotiations, and other
evidence considered useful in interpreting disputed provisions.156 Arbitrators
also regularly consider past practice in interpreting ambiguous and general
contract terms 1' and rely on past practice to add terms to silent contracts
when these terms have been established by a consistent, mutually accepted

153. Id. at 16-4 to 16-16.
154. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 293
(1990) [hereinafter POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS]. For a similar argument in a specific
context, see Stephen F. Ross, ReaganistRealism Comes To Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L.

REv. 399.
155. GRENIG, supranote 3, at 14.03(3)(a).
156. ELKOURI & ELKOUP, supranote 3, at 357-59.
157. GRENIG, supranote 3, at 14.03(5)(b), (c).
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course of conduct over a substantial period of time.'58 Arbitrators disagree
on whether clear contract terms may be changed by past practices.' 59
Is there anything in the textualists' arguments against the use of
legislative history that should cause arbitrators to rethink their reliance on
negotiating history and past practice in contract interpretation? In my view,
the arguments against the textualists' position on legislative history are strong
enough in themselves to reject a rethinking of reliance on negotiating history
and past practice. In addition, the collective bargaining and legislative
processes are so different that the problems highlighted by textualistjudges are
simply not as serious in the collective bargaining context. One of the primary
textualist arguments is that legislative history is not reliable. Justice Scalia
and Judge Easterbrook have made this point in judicial opinions with amusing
and telling examples of mistakes, manipulation, and posturing in the legislative
process.16 ° Although mistakes, manipulation, and posturing certainly occur
during the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining contracts,
the collective bargaining process is simpler and involves fewer players than
the legislative process. Where the legislative process involves the President
and the federal bureaucracy, two houses of Congress, numerous lobbyists and
interest groups, and aggressive media representatives, labor negotiations
usually involve two sides working through a limited number of designated
representatives. Public sector negotiations are more complex than those in the
private sector, but still involve fewer groups than the legislative process.
Although it is not easy to evaluate the evidence of mutual intent manifested
in negotiations and past practices, it is easier than using legislative history to
determine Congressional intent. Another argument used by Justice Scalia and
Judge Easterbrook is that excessive reliance on legislative history runs counter
to the constitutional requirements for enacting a statute because only statutory
text is voted on by both houses of Congress and signed by the President.161
While collective bargaining negotiations are governed by federal law and
union constitutions, there are good reasons why a process argument is less
persuasive when applied to labor contract interpretation. A good summary of

158. GRENIG, supra note 3, at 14.03(5)(a), (d).

159. One of the best discussions of this issue is in RICHARD XMENTHAL, PAST
PRAcTiCE AND TBE ADMINISTRATioN OF AGREE MES, PROCEEDINGs OF THE 14TH
ANNuAL MEETING OF TBE NATiONAL ACADEMY OF ARBnRATORS 30, 40-44 (1961).
Mittenthal revisited this issue at the 1993 fall educational meeting of the Academy.
THE CHRO CLE, Jan. 1994, at 10.
160. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.,
writing for the court); Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8, especially n.1 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).

161. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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such reasons was given by Judge Easterbrook when he explained why he
accepted an effort to imaginatively reconstruct party intent while interpreting
contracts:
Contracts, like laws, may have omissions and ambiguities. It is standard
practice to fill in the blanks of a contract, or interpret its ambiguities, by
supplying terms that we believe the parties would have reached themselves

if costs of bargaining were low .... The institution of contract becomes
more useful when courts relieve parties of the need to dicker over

everything in advance.... Everyone gains... when the legal rules allow
parties to conserve on bargaining costs ....

[T]he constitutional rules are

designed to increase, not minimize, the costs of enacting statutes. The
complex of hurdles, in the context of the limited time each legislature has

to act, is an essential part of the plan. So a method of interpretation
appropriate to contracts is inappropriate to legislation.. 162
One point made by the textualists does apply with some force to the issue
of whether past practice can change clear contract language. The textualists
assert that since only the text was voted on by both houses of Congress and
signed by the President, undue reliance on legislative history is contrary to the
constitutional requirement for enacting a statute. 163 The legitimacy of a
statute, in other words, results from those with authority adopting it after
following the required process, and only the text has satisfied the necessary
prerequisites for legitimacy. A similar argument could be made against using
past practice to modify clear contract language. The text of the collective
bargaining contract is the product of extensive pre-contract discussions on
each side, negotiations between management and labor, and normally,
subsequent ratification by the union membership of the proposed contract.
This process responds to and accommodates the complex web of interests
affected by collective bargaining contracts. Mutual agreement on past
practices, on the other hand, can occur without the same opportunity for the
various competing interests to participate in the process. In the conflict
between text and past practice, therefore, the text could be said to have more
legitimacy because of the superiority of the process which produced it.
Those of us who have arbitrated labor disputes for any significant period
of time are fully aware that evidence of precontract negotiations and past
practices can be unreliable or misleading. Arbitrators have pointed this out
in their opinions."M The textualist criticisms of legislative history serve as

162. Easterbrook, History,supra note 34, at 445-46.
163. See supra notes 42, 113.
164. See, e.g.,In reHospital Serv. Plan, 47 Lab. Arb. 993, 993-94 (1966) (Wolff,
Arb.) (discussing a particular issue in pre-contract negotiations); Ford Motor Co., 19

Lab. Arb. 237, 242 (1952) (Shulnan, Arb.) (discussing past practice).
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a useful reminder of the need for care in using any kind of extra-textual
source in interpreting contracts. But as Justice Stephen Breyer said in his
article, they "call, not for abandonment of the practice, but at most for its
Reading articles and judicial opinions by textualist judges
careful use."''
has, I believe, improved my ability to work with the text of labor agreements,
but I still subscribe to the following statement by William P. Murphy, a
former President of the National Academy of Arbitrators:
But the words of the contract do not stand alone; they do not exist in a
vacuum. Behind them stand the industrial practices to which the words of
the contract have reference, the bargaining history of the parties over a
period of years, and the understanding and intention of the parties when
they executed their current contract.'"6
IV. THE WRITERS
A. Introduction
Is the primary responsibility of labor arbitrators to discover and
implement the mutual intent of the parties? Is the search for intent the best
way to meet the needs of the parties and further our national labor policy?
Does the literature on statutory interpretation shed useful light on these
questions? If one assumes that the search for party intent is appropriate, does
the literature on statutory interpretation provide useful insights on how to
discover and implement mutual intent? I pointed out earlier that there is a
consensus among arbitrators that they should be guided by the mutual intent
of the parties to labor agreements.167 I also pointed out that some of the
contemporary literature on interpretation questions the possibility or
desirability of trying to discover the intent of legislative bodies' and that
for the intent of the parties to
Professor Summers has asserted that the search
1 69
artificial.
or
futile
"often
is
labor agreements

165. See supra note 139.
166. In re Southwest Ornamental Iron Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 1025, 1027 (1962)
(Murphy, Arb.).
167. See supra text accompanying note 3.
168. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 14, 22-25, 29, 30, 36, 39-44.
169. See supratext accompanying note 66.
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B. The Arguments Forand Against Using Legislative Intent
An examination of the debate over intent in the statutory interpretation
literature will assist in deciding whether arbitrators should modify their views
on intent. It helps in considering this literature to know that courts and
scholars distinguish between specific and general intent when they examine
"the mind and will of a legislature."" Specific intent refers to the writers'
intended meaning of a particular provision.' 7' How were the words being
interpreted intended to be understood? 72 General intent, usually referred to
as purpose, refers to the general purpose of all or part of a statute." 3 What
Specific
did the statute's proponents hope its enactment would achieve?"7

and general intent overlap and both have been criticized. 1'

Both are

relevant in looking at a text from the perspective of the writers, whether the
text is a statute or a collective bargaining agreement.
A recurring argument against searching for legislative intent is that
hundreds of individual legislators cannot have a single, collective intent.7
Professor Radin argued that only a few persons draft bills and that those who
vote for these bills have different views of what they mean and vote for them
for different reasons.' 77 This argument has persuaded some writers that the
concept of intent is incoherent and a fiction 7 ' and that the search for the
purpose of a statute is an act of "invention rather than discovery."' 79
Another argument is that since legislative history-the principal non-textual
evidence of intent-is unreliable,"80 any conclusions on intent will be

170. This phrase was taken from the title of Reed Dickerson, Statutory
Interpretation: A Peek into the Mind and Will of a Legislature, 50 IND. L.J. 206
(1975).
171. IhTERPRETNG STATUTES, supranote 54, at 416. See also Dickerson, supra
note 170, at 224-25.
172. GmALD C. MACCALLUM, JR., LEGISLATIVE hTENT AND OTHER ESSAYS ON
LAW, PoLITics, AND MoRALITY 6 (1993).

173. INTERPRETNG STATUTES, supranote 54, at 514. See also Dickerson, supra
note 170, at 224-25.
174. See MACCALLUM, supra note 172, at 6-10.
175. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 57, at 426-34.
176. See MACCALLUM, supra note 172, at 13-18; Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1930).
177. Radin, supra note 176, at 870-71.
178. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, UpdatingStatutory Interpretation,87 MIcH.
L. REV. 20,25 (1988); Sunstein, supranote57, at 433; supratext accompanying notes
30, 31.
179. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 428.

180. See supra text accompanying notes 39, 40.
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unreliable. Finally, it is asserted that legislative bodies vote only on the text
of a statute, not on their interpretation of the text's meaning.'
Defenders of legislative intent maintain that they are not arguing that a
majority of legislators share the same subjective view of a statute." They
do not assume that there is some kind of "aggregate mind."'" Instead, they
say that intent refers to the meaning attributed to the statute's provisions by
the institutional actors who drafted or shepherded it through the legislative
Tradition and practical necessity legitimize acceptance by
process."M
legislators of statements about the meaning of bills by sponsors, committees,
staffers, and other important actors in the process." 5 The reader charged
with interpreting a statute should examine all of the textual and non-textual
evidence to try to determine what the words of the statute meant to these
important institutional actors. A useful way of looking at this evidence is to
ask what message or command these institutional actors were trying to
convey.18 6 The fact that this task cannot be perfectly performed is not a
persuasive argument against trying since perfect performance is not possible
under any of the alternative approaches to interpretation."s Nicholas Zeppos
has pointed out that there are numerous areas of the law in which we inquire
into the intent of a collective body.18
Legislative supremacy over the judicial branch is a basic premise of our
legal culture. 9 Professor Reed Dickerson has said, "the most important
function of the concept of subjective legislative intent is to put the judge or
other interpreter in a proper,, deferential frame of mind vis-a-vis the
Daniel Farber has asserted that ignoring legislative intent
legislature." '

181. See supra text accompanying notes 29, 30.
182. E.g., Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy,
78 GEo. L.J. 281, 290 (1989) [hereinafter Farber, Supremacy].

183. See Gwen T. Handelman, Zen and the Art ofStatutory Construction: A Tax
Lawyer'sAccount of Enlightenment, 40 DEPAuL L. REv. 611, 625 (1991).
184. See id. at 615; Farber, Supremacy, supra note 182, at 290. Professor
MacCallum referred to this view of attributing intent to the institutional actors as the
Agency Model of legislative intent. MAcCALLUM, supranote 172, at 29-32.

185. See Farber, Supremacysupranote182, at 290; Nicholas S.Zeppos, Toward
a Fact FindingModel, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1345-47 (1990).
186. See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supranote24, at 265, 269-78 (discussing a statute
as a command to the judiciary and as analogous to an order from a platoon commander
to a lieutenant heading the lead platoon in an attack).
187. See Maltz, supranote 18, at 778.
188. Zeppos, supra note 185, at 1341. An example would be a corporation,
which can act only through the individual acts of many employees, being convicted of
a crime which includes intent as an element of the offense. Id.
189. Farber, Supremacy,supra note 182, at 292; Maltz, supranote 18, at 769.
190. Dickerson, supranote 170, at 223.
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would hinder the ability of the democratic branches of government to function
effectively."' Nicholas Zeppos has written that such an approach would
produce results that the legislative branch would never have enacted." 9 To
Daniel Farber, the search for intent helps the interpreter see the difference
between creative interpretation and "rewriting the statute to suit one's
desires." 3 Gwen Handelman believes that critics of legislative intent have
overstated the difficulty of discovering intent in order to help make the case
for the exercise of broader discretion by judges in interpreting statutes."
C. Using Mutual Intent In InterpretingCollective
BargainingAgreements
The critique of the search for intent helps provide a realistic
understanding of what is involved in such a search. Even so, the articles
mentioned above have convinced me that there are important reasons to
continue the search. There is an even stronger case for considering intent
while interpreting collective bargaining contracts. The search for intent in
collective bargaining is simpler than the search for legislative intent."9
Although the collective bargaining process is more complex than the
negotiations which produce most contracts, it is simpler and involves fewer
players than the legislative process. Judge Easterbrook has stated that it is
appropriate to imaginatively reconstruct the intent of parties to a contract
because this helps parties conserve on bargaining costs, but reconstructing
intent is inappropriate in interpreting statutes because the constitutional rules
on the enactment of statutes are "designed to increase, not minimize the 'costs'
'
of enacting statutes."196
The search for intent encourages arbitrators to look
beyond the text for evidence of the meaning of the agreement and this helps
arbitrators deal with issues that cannot be resolved satisfactorily by relying
only on the text. For example, if both parties misunderstood the words they
used in the contract because they were not aware of linguistic conventions
widely shared in the industrial relations community, I believe the arbitrator
should usually interpret the contract to mean what they intended rather than
what they actually said." 7

191. Farber, Supremacy, supranote 182, at 291.
192. Zeppos, supra note 185, at 1314.
193. Farber, Supremacy,supra note 182, at 297.
194. Handelman, supranote 183, at 613. See also Maltz, supranote 18, at 773,
779-82.
195. See supratext accompanying notes 161-63; POSNER, PROBLEMS, supranote
24, at 277.
196. Easterbrook, History,supra note 34, at 446.
197. See MACCALLuM, supra note 172, at 10-12.
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An important reason why arbitrators should regularly consider evidence
of party intent is that this will help keep them focused on their proper role.
The concept of legislative supremacy influences courts to give greater weight
to legislative commands than to their own views of desirable policy.
Arbitrators give more weight to the parties' mutual intent than to their own
views of justice and fairness because the legitimacy of a collective bargaining
agreement derives primarily from the parties' agreement rather than from the
agreement's compatibility with overriding concepts of justice and fairness.198
Although federal law subjects labor agreements to a variety of requirements,
the underlying policy of federal labor law is that most of the terms and
conditions of employment should be determined by labor and
management-representatives of the people who have to live with the terms
and conditions. David Feller described the result as a system of industrial
self-government.199 The arbitrator's role in this system of industrial selfgovernment is to serve as the parties' "officially designated reader of the
contract."20 0 Reed Dickerson's suggestion that the most important function
of legislative intent is to put the interpreter in a deferential frame of mind
toward the legislature 0 1 is applicable to arbitrators as well. Indeed, I would
argue that the case for deference by arbitrators is stronger than the case for
deference by judges since arbitrators are assigned a more modest role in our
legal system. Searching for mutual intent reminds arbitrators that they are
servants of the parties. To an arbitrator faced with an ambiguous contract,
thinking of her task as a search for mutual intent helps remind her of her
proper role. Professor Summers' characterization of the search for intent as
"futile or artificial" and his emphasis on the need to focus on just results
instead of the text sends the wrong message to arbitrators. It is, of
course, true that an arbitrator cannot always discover the parties' mutual intent
and that an arbitrator's task is not a mechanical one. On the other hand, I
believe Professor Farber's point about the search for legislative intent0 3 is

198. See Shulman, supra note 58 at, 1016.
199. DAviD E. FELLER, THE COMING END OF ARBITRATION'S GOLDEN AGE,
PROCEDiNS OF TE TWENTY-NnTH ANNUAL MEETiNG OF Tnm NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 107 (BNA 1976).
200. Theodore J. St. Antoine, JudicialReview of Labor ArbitrationAwards: A
Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MicH. L. REV. 1137, 1140
(1977). For an analysis of how the arbitrator's role is different when questions of
external law are involved see Stephen L. Hayford & Anthony V. Sinicropi, The Labor
Contractand ExternalLaw: Revisiting the Arbitrator'sScope of Authority, 1993 J.
DIsP. RESOL. 249.
201. Dickerson, supra note 170, at 223.
202. See the language quoted supra text accompanying note 66.
203. Supra text accompanying note 193.
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equally applicable to labor arbitrators: focusing on mutual intent can help
arbitrators see the difference between creative interpretation and rewriting the
collective bargaining contract to suit their own policy views. Searching for
party intent can help liberate literal-minded arbitrators and restrain those who
have a tendency toward activism.
The search for intent can be illustrated by examining an issue that has
received considerable attention from arbitrators. Most collective bargaining
agreements provide expressly that employers may discipline or discharge only
for 'just" or "proper" cause. 2 A few contracts are silent on this issue.
Arbitrators differ on whether it is appropriate to imply a just cause provision
when the contract is silent." 5 One argument for implying such a provision
is that a just cause provision is "part and parcel of the fabric of the collective
bargaining process and is an inherent element of any collective bargaining
agreement to which the parties have set their hands."2 6 Another argument
is that other contract provisions such as those giving seniority protection could
be nullified if there were no limits on the employer's right to discipline and
discharge. 7 The first argument amounts to an assertion that all labor
contracts impliedly contain important provisions that are included in most
labor contracts. This results in contract provisions based on consensus in the
labor-management community rather than agreementby parties to the contract.
In rejecting the second argument, arbitrator Dennis Nolan pointed out that "an
arbitrator could easily prohibit discharges used to nullify seniority, layoff, or
other specific provisions without requiring an employer to demonstrate just
2
cause for every discharge.""
My view is that arbitrators who interpret a
silent contract as requiring an employer to demonstrate just cause for every
discharge are reading their own substantive preferences into the contract.
How can an arbitrator deal with this issue on some basis other than
simply deciding what she thinks is right? I do not think the reserved rights
doctrine 9 should be relied on because the assumption that management

204.

ARNOLD ZACK, JUST CAUSE AND PROGRESSIVE DIcILNE, LABOR AND

EMPLOYhMNT ARBITRATION 19-5 (TimBornstein& Ann Gosline eds., 1988); ELKOURI

& ELKOURI supra note 3, at 652.
205. For cases implying a just cause provision see the cases collected in ZACK,
supranote 204, at 19-5 n.2; ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supranote 3, at 652 n.6. For cases
refusing to imply such a provision see the cases collected in ZACK, supranote 204, at
19-6 n.3; ELKOURI & ELKOURUI supra note 3, at 651 n.4.

206. In re Binswanger Glass Co., 92 Lab. Arb. 1153, 1155 (1989) (Nicholas,
Arb.).
207. In re Atwater Mfg. Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 747, 749 (1949) (Donnelly, Arb.).
208. In re Westvaco, Virginia Folding Box Div., 92 Lab. Arb. 1289, 1291 (1989)
(Nolan, Arb.).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 150-55.
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retains discretion over all matters not covered by express language simply
substitutes another kind of substantive preference. I believe that an arbitrator
should begin the analysis of this issue by searching for the parties' mutual
intent. She should consider other contract provisions, bargaining history, and
past practices. If these sources do not provide evidence of intent, the
arbitrator should try to imaginatively reconstruct contract negotiations in
somewhat the same way that Judge Posner has said a legislative process can
be reconstructed.210 While it is true that this process of reconstruction could
easily become a process of invention rather than discovery," the search for
mutual intent will help arbitrators avoid the temptation to rewrite the contract
to suit their own policy preferences."'
In reconstructing contract
negotiations, it would be reasonable to assume that the union sought a just
cause provision. I cannot imagine a union not asking for such a provision
since protection from arbitrary discipline or discharge is probably the most
important selling point unions have when they organize employees.
Management normally agrees to such a provision. In many cases,
management probably uses the union's desire for a just cause provision to
extract union concessions on other issues. The absence of a just cause
provision indicates that management considered it important not to include
such a provision213 and that the union was unable to overcome this
resistance. I personally believe that all labor contracts should include a
requirement of just cause, but our national labor policy leaves the decision on
this issue with the parties, not the arbitrator. One of the reasons we allow the
parties to develop terms and conditions of employment is to allow them to
adapt their agreement to their unique circumstances. If arbitrators imply
provisions because they are important and are included in most contracts, it
will be harder for parties to adapt their contracts to their own unique
circumstances. It is not a satisfactory answer to say that if this is really
important to management, they should bargain for a provision specifically
stating that the employer may discipline or discharge without regard to just
cause. Getting the union membership to approve such a provision would be
much more difficult than getting them to approve a contract that is silent on
the issue. The difference between a silent contract and such a provision is the
difference between losing and being humiliated.

210. Posner, supranote 27.
211. This phrase was taken from Sunstein, supra note 57, at 428. Professor
Sunstein criticizes the purpose approach to interpretation with this phrase.
212. See Farber, Supremacy,supra note 193.
213. See Truck Drivers Local 705 v. Schneider Tank Lines, 958 F.2d 171, 175

(7th Cir. 1992) (exemplifying the kind of situation where an employer considered it
important to be able to discharge employees without being limited by a just cause

provision).
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On the other hand, there is a strong case for implying from a just cause
provision arbitral power to modify penalties imposed by management. Some
agreements expressly grant power to modify penalties and some expressly
prohibit such modification.214 Many, if not most, collective bargaining
agreements include a just cause provision but do not deal expressly with
whether an arbitrator has the power to modify penalties. 15 In such a
situation, most arbitrators imply from the just cause provision the power to
modify penalties that are considered too severe under all the circumstances
present in the case.216 It is reasonable to imply such a power because while
it is just to punish an employee for misconduct, it is not just to impose
punishment that is out of all proportion to the seriousness of the conductunder
all the circumstances. There are cases in which it would be just to suspend
an employee without pay but it would not be just to discharge the employee.
An employer normally would not be justified in discharging an employee for
a single instance of tardiness, absence from work, or negligence. Repeated

instances of such conduct accompanied by appropriate warnings would justify
a discharge.2 1

When the question is whether there was just cause for a

sanction imposed by an employer, proportionality between conduct and
sanction is a necessary inquiry. Such an inquiry is justified by use of the
word just in the contract and can also be justified by a reconstruction of
contract negotiations. If an arbitrator is called upon to reconstruct contract
negotiations on this issue, the clear link between proportionality of a sanction
and justice would justify an arbitrator in concluding that the parties intended
to give the arbitrator the power to modify penalties imposed by management
when they agreed to a just cause provision. Experienced negotiators know
that proportionality between conduct and sanction is a value shared by
management and labor. While they often disagree on application of the idea
in a particular case, they seldom disagree on the importance of seeking a
sanction that is proportional to the misconduct.
I am convinced that the search for intent by arbitrators helps them meet
the needs of the parties and further our national labor policy. On the other
hand, there are enough problems in searching for and using intent that I am
not persuaded that this should be the primary metaphor relied on by labor

214. ELKOURi & ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 667.
215. See Harry H. Platt, The Arbitration Process in the Settlement of Labor
Disputes, 31 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 54, 58 (1947).
216. Id. See the discussion in ELKoURI & ELKoURI, supra note 3, 667, 668.
There are differences of opinion on how much an arbitrator should defer to
management's judgment on the appropriateness of penalties. Comparelnre Stockham
Pipe Fittings Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 160, 162-63 (1945) (McCoy, Arb.), with In re Riley
Stoker Corp., 7 Lab. Arb. 764, 767 (1947) (Platt, Arb.).
217. Seethe discussioninELKoURi & ELKOURI, supranote 3, at 670-71, 682-83.
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arbitrators. The concept of intent is a useful but not a perfect tool. Mutual
intent cannot always be discovered. There often is no mutual intent to
discover. Intent and purpose are difficult concepts that can easily be
misunderstood"' or misused. It is hard to deny that the search for intent has
often been an act of creation rather than discovery.219
V.

CONCLUSION

I began this Article by using a quotation from a book by Professor
William Popkin to ask whether statutes should be viewed from the perspective
of the reader, the text, or the writer.2 ° I suggested that the same question
can be asked about collective bargaining contracts and that useful insights can
be obtained by looking at the interpretation of such contracts from these three
perspectives.
My review of the statutory interpretation literature has led me to several
specific conclusions and a general conclusion on the most appropriate overall
perspective. The reader perspective shows the inevitability of looking beyond
" ' It
text in interpreting both statutes and collective bargaining contracts.22
provides powerful arguments for rejecting the plain meaning rule as a guide
to the relative importance of text as compared with other evidence of the
meaning of labor agreements.222 As Professor Popkin said in discussing
statutory interpretation: "The interpretive process is almost certainly ...one
of moving back and forth between words and other indicia of meaning without
preconceived notions about whether the words are clear."2" However, too

much emphasis on the reader perspective could tempt an arbitrator to rewrite

224
the contract to suit her own substantive preferences.
The appeal of the textual perspective results in part from wide agreement
that the ordinary meaning of the specific section of the text in question is
normally the strongest argument that can be made for a particular
interpretation.'
Textualists have also demonstrated the persuasiveness of

218. See, e.g., INTEPRETNG STATUTEs, supra note 54, at 520, 522 (discussing
subjective and objective approaches).

219. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 428.
220. See supra text and quotation accompanying note 1.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 6-11, 70-102, 102-43.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 70-102.
223. Popkin, CollaborativeModel, supranote 49, at 594.
224. See Farber, Supremacy,supra note 182, at 297; supra text accompanying
notes 192-97.
225. See ITERPRET]NG STATrUrS, supra note 54, at 531, 533; Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 49, at 351.
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contextual-harmonization arguments based on other parts of the statute.226
Contextual-harmonization techniques are equally applicable to the
interpretation of labor agreements. Textualist arguments against using
legislative history serve to remind arbitrators to use great care when relying
on past practice or bargaining history.227 They do not make a good case for
entirely disregarding such aids to contract interpretation.22 A serious
problem with giving too much emphasis to text is that this can lead to results
the parties would never have agreed to and can be a subtle way of
disregarding the parties' wishes.229
Searching for party intent is legitimized by long tradition. It is possible
to argue that all interpretation consists of looking for the writers' intent.
Professor Campos, for example, has pointed to a body of scholarly writing
that he says
refutes the fallacy of the autonomous text, a fallacy that remains of crucial
rhetorical importance to practically all theories of legal interpretation. If
strong intentionalism is correct, then a text can only mean what its author

intends it to mean, and it follows that interpreting a text simply consists in
looking for that intention. Textual meaning and authorial intent are not
separable concepts, and searching for one is by necessity synonymous with
30
seeking the other.2
Searching for intent can serve as a reminder to arbitrators of their proper role
and help them strike an appropriate balance when they evaluate conflicting
evidence of contractual meaning."s On the other hand, intent means
different things to different interpreters,u 2 and even when there is agreement
on the meaning of intent, it is often difficult or impossible to discover. 3
Further, there is no denying that the search for intent can serve as a cover for
a deliberate reading of the arbitrators' personal values into the contract."4

226. See supratext accompanying notes 103, 104. A description of contextualharmonization arguments can be found in hTPRETING STATJTEs, supranote 54, at
464-65.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 114-18, 155-60, 164-65.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 160-66.
229. See Farber, Supremacy,supra note 182, at 289-90.
230. Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the
Autonomous Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1065, 1091 (1993). See also id. at 1082
n.72.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 198-208.
232. See INTERPRETING

STATUES,

supra note 54, at 522-25.

233. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 433.
234. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 428, 435-37.
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My general conclusion is that arbitrators should not place primary
emphasis on any single perspective or approach. Arbitrators will come closer
to meeting the parties' needs and furthering national labor policy if they view
the task of interpretation from all three perspectives. Some cases are best
dealt with by emphasizing text; some cases call for an emphasis on party
intent; some cases leave an arbitrator room to exercise considerable creativity.
The arbitrator should look at each case from all three perspectives before she
begins writing her opinion. To me, the most persuasive writers on statutory
interpretation are those who argue that it is not possible to attain a unified
theory 35 I believe a unified theory of interpreting labor agreements is
equally unattainable. The best one can do is identify the legitimate arguments
that may be utilized. In this view, reliance on text, intent, or desirable results
are arguments to consider in reaching a decision and in formulating arguments
to explain an interpretation of a collective bargaining contract. Philip Bobbitt
has described such an approach to the interpretation of the United States
Constitution. 6 Bobbitt asserts that there is no overarching rule or theory
governing the choice among arguments. 7 I believe this is true also of the
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. Richard Fallon has
provided a typology of accepted arguments in constitutional interpretation3
and Neil MacCormick and Robert Summers have reviewed statutory
interpretation throughout the world to produce eleven argument types that play
an important part in the interpretation of statutes." If I had to list the
arguments over the meaning of labor agreements in order of weight or
persuasiveness, I would place text first and good results last. In particular
cases, however, there usually is uncertainty about the decisiveness of a
particular argument, and there are many opportunities to accommodate
arguments. In practice, I suspect the best an arbitrator can do is review the
various arguments and reach an intuitive judgment. As she writes her opinion,
she should test her intuitive judgment against the arguments to see whether it
stands up. If it does, she signs the opinion and sends it off to the parties.

235. See, e.g., Farber, Supremacy,supra note 182, at 281. See also Bradley C.

Karkkainen, "PlainMeaning:" Justice Scalia's Jurisprudenceof Strict Statutory
Construction,17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 464-71 (1994).
236. PHiLip BoBBrrr, CoNsTrrr'roNAL FATE 6-8, 246-49 (paperback ed. 1984).
237. PHiLIP BoBBrrr, CoNsTrruoNAL INTERPRETATION 168-70 (1991).
238. Richard Fallon, A Constructive Coherence Theory of Constitutional

Interpretation,100 HARv. L. REv. 1189 (1987).
239. See INTEU)RETiNG STATUTES, supra note 54, at 512-15 (summarizing the
eleven argument types).
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The most appealing statement of what I believe is the best approach to
interpretation is found in a work that did not focus on interpretation. It is
included in a reading entitled "The Pivot" in Thomas Merton's book entitled
The Way of Chuang Tzu:
Tao is obscured when men understand only one of a pair of opposites or
concentrate only on a particular aspect of being....
...The pivot of Tao passes through the center where all affirmations and
denials converge. He who grasps the pivot is at the still-point from which
all movements and oppositions can be seen in their right relationships.
240
Hence he sees the limitless possibilities of both "yes" and "no.i
241
Merton defines Tao as "The Way, The Absolute, The Ultimate Principle."
Merton says that Chuang Tzu took opposite sides of the same question in

different contexts24 2 and that the key to his thought is the "complementarity
of opposites." 24" To Chuang Tzu, life changes continually and what is good
in today's circumstances may be bad in tomorrow's. The Tao is obscured
when one treats partial views as the answer to all questions. 2 "
Clouds become rain and vapor ascends again to become clouds. To insist
that the
cloud should never turn to rain is to resist the dynamism of
24 5
Tao.
What, then, is a collective bargaining contract? It is what the arbitrator
derives from the evidence of contractual meaning after grasping the pivot of
Tao.

240. THOMAS MRTON, Tim WAY OF CHUANG Tzu 42, 43 (New Directions
1965). Chuang Tzu was a Taoist who wrote toward the end of the classic period of
Chinese philosophy. Id. at 15.
241. Id.at 15.
242. Id. at 29.
243. Id. at 30.
244. Id.
245. Id.at 31.
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